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While the international regime of Port State Control is relatively developed, this 
paper does the analysis on the standpoint of current international legislation, 
including United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the generally 
accepted international regulations established and developed through the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO Treaties) as well as relevant IMO 
instruments such as Assembly Resolutions, so as to explore the legal basis of PSC 
regime in international law sphere.  Whilst the legal certainty is established, several 
practical issues relating to the operation of PSC are discussed.  Major focuses are 
made on regional PSC cooperation, academic categorization of PSC deficiencies, the 
effect of participation of Classification Societies, remedy for undue delay of ships 
derived from PSC decisions, the effect and the future tendency.  Suggestions on the 
development of PSC-related legislation and enforcement in China are made in 
accordance with domestic circumstances. 
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The shipping industry constitutes the cornerstone of international maritime 
transportation in the age of globalization.  Meanwhile, the sea on which the 
shipping industry exclusively relies has been too vulnerable to undergo any further 
challenges such as marine pollution.  In other words, the sea is the paramount 
resource for our living, thus shipping utilizing the sea should ensure safety, security 
and anti-pollution at the urgent request of international community. 
The International Maritime Organization, as a specialized agency of the United 
Nations has engaged in establishing and developing international regulations on 
safety, security and anti-pollution at sea for several decades.  While IMO’s work of 
international legislation made some achievements by the late 1970s, represented by 
the establishment of international Treaties of the “International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended”, the “Protocol of 1978 relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973, as 
amended”, and the “International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended”, fatalities and marine pollution 
as a result of marine casualties result in severe damage to the water areas of coastal 
States and pose huge public pressure upon political leaders.  In this sense, endeavor 
to effective solutions at international level through law-making Treaties has never 
been ceased.  UNCLOS provides for general legal framework for States Parties in 
respect of safety navigation and anti-pollution, while IMO Treaties being compatible 
with UNCLOS set out specific requirements for the enforcement of stakeholders 
involved, including the States and individuals such as ship-owners.  Nevertheless, 
certain states and individuals fail to discharge their duties derived from those 
international Treaties primarily because of the fiscal consideration and limit of 
available resources.  That is, ship-owners have to take into account the financial 
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advantages before any decision relating to their business, and national laws and 
policies of States concerning such maritime affairs as ship registry and safe manning 
level of ships flying their flag would be adopted and enforced on the basis of those 
States’ practical situation.  Consequently, inconsistency of implementation and 
enforcement of relevant international treaties at international level exists.  In 
response, an international regime concentrating on the control of port States over 
foreign ships in their ports comes into play. 
Port State jurisdiction or PSC is the power of the port State derived from UNCLOS 
and relevant IMO Treaties, as well as certain ILO Conventions, focusing particularly 
on examining the compliance of foreign-flagged ships calling the local ports with 
applicable laws, including international standards and domestic rules.  Once defects 
are established as a result of physical inspections by officials of the port State, 
intervention actions, inter alia, rectification with deadline, suspension of cargo 
operation and detention may be imposed by PSC authority of the port State so as to 
ensure that they are fit to proceed to sea without threat to safety and security of ships 
and people onboard, and marine environment.  In this sense, PSC is of a corrective 
approach in accordance with applicable international regulations and, of a preventive 
regime against risks from foreign ships in order to protect the interests of the port 
State. 
Since almost all maritime nations play the role of the port State, the flag State and the 
coastal State within the shipping community, PSC regime refers primarily to, at the 
national level, three major concerns: 
 In the capacity of the port State, the State takes charge of control over foreign 
ships as a major implementation and enforcement of relevant international 
regulations; 
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 In the capacity of the flag State, the State takes effective jurisdiction over its 
ships to ensure their compliance with applicable international standards, thereby 
to avoid intervention by foreign PSC authorities; and 
 In the capacity of the coastal State, the State is entitled to make use of PSC 
regime in order to prevent pollution damage and risks thereof within its water 
areas from foreign ships. 
2. Legal Basis of PSC Regime 
This section endeavors to explore the legal basis of PSC regime under international 
law, particularly relevant provisions in UNCLOS, IMO Treaties and interrelation 
thereof, thereby makes analysis on the essence and legitimacy of PSC regime. 
2.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
As a result of the negotiation at an international level – the third United Nations 
Conference on the law of the sea – from 1973 to 1982, United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea was adopted and came into effect in 1994.  UNCLOS 
establishes the general framework of international law, which was signed and ratified 
by 165 sovereign nations as at 23 January 2013 (UN, 2013).  In general UNCLOS 
confers rights to coastal and landlocked States in respect of utilizing resources of the 
sea in order to establish “a just and equitable international economic order” on the 
basis of “mutual understanding and cooperation” (United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (1982)). 
UNCLOS elaborates three types of States which are central and active in the legal 
framework of law of the sea: the Flag State, the Coastal State and the Port State.  
While concentration of Flag State is made primarily on its responsibilities, duties and 
enforcement, UNCLOS mainly stipulates powers of Coastal State and Port State in 
tackling both general and particular affairs concerned.  The concept of Flag State is 
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deeply associated with commercial ships and ship registry institution, i.e. the Flag 
State of a commercial ship is the State the ship gets registry under its laws.  
Therefore, the ship is subject to domestic laws of the State whose flag it is entitled to 
fly, and obligations of enforcement fall under Flag State jurisdiction.  The concept 
of “Coastal State” primarily refers to the delimitation of various “zones” such as 
coast, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone derived from 
provisions of UNCLOS, and in turn relevant rights and obligations attached are 
clarified.  Port State is the State whose ports are open to call of foreign-flagged 
ships.  It is notable that reference of delimiting the territorial sea/coast is also made 
to the concept of the port.  In accordance with UNCLOS, “the outermost permanent 
harbor works which form an integral part of the harbor system are regarded as 
forming part of the coast” of the Port State (United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (1982)).  In this sense, particular ports for ships’ cargo operation within 
the harbor area which forms part of the coast is absolutely deemed part of Port State 
territory.  Furthermore, despite the different characteristics, foregoing three types of 
States are closely interconnected in shipping practice.  In other words, UNCLOS 
establishes three kinds of interrelated jurisdictions.  Differing from the authorities 
of official organizations such as Courts to make legal decisions on matters submitted, 
jurisdictions in UNCLOS specifically refer to those of States, i.e. State jurisdictions 
in which a particular system of laws take major effect.  Since almost all shipping 
nations maintain those three capacities, prevailing international seaborne trade gives 
rise to the intersection among those three jurisdictions especially within local ports 
and maritime zones of one State.  For instance, whilst the ship flying the flag of 
State A calls one port of State B, the ship is at present subject to the control of both 
the flag State A and the port State B, owning to jurisdictions respectively.  Whilst 
the ship proceeds to sea after cargo operation through territorial sea of State B, State 
B now in the capacity of the Coastal State is empowered to enforce its laws upon the 
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ship, when appropriate.   
2.2 Interrelation between UNCLOS and IMO Treaties 
The interrelation between UNCLOS and IMO Treaties plays an essential role in 
ascertaining the legal basis of PSC in international law sphere.  It has been clarified 
that the rights and obligations derived from other international agreements shall not 
be altered by respects of UNCLOS unless those agreements are not compatible with 
UNCLOS.  In this condition, States Parties to UNCLOS are entitled to conclude 
other agreements which are applicable solely to the relation among them regulating 
operative particulars in specific fields, without prejudice to the application of 
principles and effective execution of purpose under UNCLOS.  Therefore, the 
compatibility of IMO Treaties with UNCLOS should be taken into account seriously.  
In general, goals of UNCLOS lie in “strengthening of peace, security, cooperation 
and friendly relations among all nations”, based on clear consciousness that 
“problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a 
whole” (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)).  Motto of IMO 
“safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans” (IMO, 2013a) definitely 
demonstrates its mission and vision – taking all necessary steps towards ship safety 
navigation, security of both ship and people involved and prevention of marine 
pollution, in order to achieve efficient international shipping.  Obviously, 
abovementioned maritime affairs embodied in IMO Treaties accurately respect the 
ultimate goals of UNCLOS.  In other words, marine casualties involving foreign 
ships or seafarers would by no means prompt friendly international relations.  As 
for cooperation, not only IMO itself originally focuses on providing “machinery for 
cooperation among governments” (Convention on the International Maritime 
Organization (1948)), but its extensive technical cooperation program at present 
which engages in development of human resources particularly in developing nations 
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by means of maritime training also makes contribution, and PSC regime elaborated 
in most important IMO Treaties is initially with nature of inter-governmental 
cooperation.  Furthermore, active participation of IMO Secretariat in the third UN 
conference on law of the sea evidences the substantial compatibility between 
UNCLOS and IMO’s work after 1973, and the potential conflicts between IMO 
instruments and UNCLOS have been effectively avoided by virtue of explicit 
expression in several IMO Treaties such as SOLAS, MARPOL and AFS on no 
derogation from, or prejudice to, the codification and development of UNCLOS.  
For instance, apart from general requirements for that nothing in Treaties or relevant 
instruments should prejudice the rights, jurisdiction or obligations of States under 
international law, 
 Ships’ routeing and reporting systems and actions taken by Governments to 
implement and enforce SOLAS regulations “shall be consistent with relevant 
provisions” of UNCLOS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974, as amended (1980)); and 
 Nothing in MARPOL and STCW shall make infringement on the “codification 
and development” of UNCLOS; the application of MARPOL shall not “derogate 
from or extending” the sovereignty of Parties under UNCLOS (Protocol of 1978 
relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973, as amended (1978)). 
2.3 Effects of IMO Treaties under UNCLOS 
While the wording “International Maritime Organization” is merely mentioned in 
Annex , Article 2 (2) of UNCLOS referring arbitration, the expression  “Ⅷ the 
competent international organization” should be applied “exclusively to IMO” (IMO, 
2008).   It indicates that international effects or global mandate of IMO Treaties 
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have been recognized under UNCLOS.  This assertion is acceptable mainly as 
firstly, the consistency between the goals of IMO and UNCLOS discussed above; 
secondly, the expression under UNCLOS is primarily used in respect of establishing 
international rules and standards, including safety navigation schemes such as 
routeing systems, against pollution from ships.  Those rules and standards shall be 
established through “the competent international organization” and adopted by States 
involved such that rules and standards could be generally accepted at international 
level.  In other words, the “the competent international organization” plays the role 
of establishing machinery, providing States an appropriate platform for direct 
negotiations, encouraging and facilitating the eventual adoption of proposals which 
would be applicable to all individual States involved and be reviewed continuously.  
That role under UNCLOS falls exactly under the purpose of IMO provided for in the 
IMO Convention.  Thirdly and most importantly, the generally accepted 
international standards through the competent international organization which shall 
be complied with by States in exercising of powers and discharging of obligations 
have been definitely related to particular IMO Treaties.  Article 39 of UNCLOS 
regulates ships in transit passage conforming to the generally accepted international 
regulations on safety at sea, including IMO’s International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at sea.  Table 1 clearly illustrates the nature of general 







Table 1 – Status of IMO Treaties 
Instrument Date of entry into force




IMO Convention 17-Mar-1958 170 97.16 
SOLAS 1974 25-May-1980 162 99.20 
SOLAS Protocol 1978 1-May-1981 117 96.86 
SOLAS Protocol 1988 3-Feb-2000 104 95.70 
LL 1966 21-Jul-1968 161 99.19 
LL Protocol 1988 3-Feb-2000 98 95.96 
TONNAGE 1969 18-Jul-1982 152 99.06 
COLREG 1972 15-Jul-1977 155 98.71 
STCW 1978 28-Apr-1984 157 99.23 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex I/II) 
2-Oct-1983 152 99.20 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex III) 
1-Jul-1992 138 97.59 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex IV) 
27-Sep-2003 131 89.65 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex V) 
31-Dec-1988 144 98.47 
MARPOL Protocol 1997 
(Annex VI) 
19-May-2005 72 94.30 
AFS Convention 2001 17-Sep-2008 65 82.25 
Source: International Maritime Organization. (2013). Summary of Status of Conventions.  
Retrieved 4 May, 2013 from World Wide Web: 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Summary%20of%20Sta
tus%20of%20Conventions.xls 
It is evident from the table that the most important IMO Treaties, i.e. SOLAS, 
MARPOL and STCW which cover essential domains of safety of navigation, 
anti-pollution and qualification of seafarers respectively, have been in the situation of 
universal mandate, as manifested by the absolute majority of contracting Parties 
which represent “all but a fraction of world merchant fleet” (IMO, 2013). 
Furthermore, provisions of UNCLOS have made obligations upon States Parties to 
be in conformity with the generally accepted international regulations, major sources 
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of which absolutely fall under IMO Treaties on account of their universal mandate 
mentioned above.  Typically in accordance with Article 94 of UNCLOS, each flag 
State is required to conform to the generally accepted international regulations such 
that ships flying its flag could be effectively placed under its control.  In this sense, 
Parties to UNCLOS have to comply with requirements of IMO Treaties in spite of 
the circumstance that they have not ratified particular IMO Treaties. 
In addition to encouraging of formulation and elaboration of new and compatible 
international regulations for anti-pollution, UNCLOS endeavors to put up as few as 
possible barriers upon the maintenance or validity of other special conventions and 
agreements with the spirit of protection and preservation of the marine environment 
which were established prior to UNCLOS.  As premise, specific obligations on 
States derived from those regulations and conventions should be discharged in a 
consistent manner in the light of general principles set forth in UNCLOS (United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)). 
2.4 The Necessity of IMO Treaties 
Since legal certainty has been established through foregoing discussion as to the 
compatibility of IMO Treaties with UNCLOS, it is essential to ascertain the practical 
necessity of IMO Treaties.  UNCLOS is generally acknowledged as an “umbrella 
convention” mainly because its provisions are lack of operability.  That is, those as 
general principles, e.g. “cooperate on a global basis”, “take measures necessary”, 
“establish particular requirements”, “institute proceedings”, etc. should be equipped 
with criteria for individual States and shipping community to exercise and evaluate.  
Given the fact that IMO Treaties concentrate on “governmental regulation and 
practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping (Convention on 
the International Maritime Organization (1948))”, i.e. regulate specific operative 
features in the context of shipping, effective enforcement of UNCLOS could be 
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attained through that of IMO Treaties.  In practice, if all individual shipping nations 
develop their own legislation as to safety and anti-pollution at sea, conflicts among 
jurisdictions or national laws would inevitably lead to the situation of disorder in the 
whole shipping community as no single party or entity is able to justify certain 
behaviors without consistent legal basis.  In turn, the industry as a whole would be 
destroyed since such international actors as owners/operators are very much likely to 
be in trouble in almost each port of call.  In this sense, IMO Treaties of “highest 
practicable standards” (Convention on the International Maritime Organization 
(1948)) play vital role in directing the behaviors of shipping actors, including the 
Governments who possess powers and assume duties, and owners/operators who 
actually control the operable level of individual ships. 
While IMO Treaties of SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, LL, TONNAGE, and AFS 
accurately respect the aforesaid direction set out in UNCLOS, they make reasonable 
modifications in accordance with specialty in the fields they covered respectively.  
For instance, the detection of violations with respect to anti-pollution is expressly 
strengthened by MARPOL to the extent that “all appropriate and practicable 
measures” (Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as amended (1978)) shall be taken on the 
basis of cooperation among Parties, and the port State is entitled to impose detection 
of discharge violation in any place on ships of call either at the request of any other 
Parties or on its own initiative.  The scope of detection or inspection shall be subject 
to operational requirements detailed in 6 annexes which constitute legitimate reason 
for detention.  While the PSC inspection under TONNAGE shall on no condition 
delay the ship, STCW reasonably constrains the conditions for detention in detail. 
2.5 PSC Regime under UNCLOS 
Briefly, PSC is of the control by individual States over foreign ships in local ports.  
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Therefore, it is necessary for seeking whether UNCLOS reveals relevant principles 
or elaborates powers/duties for States Parties to exercise PSC. 
Anti-pollution and safety navigation which constitute major aspects within PSC 
regime, maintain considerable weight under UNCLOS.  Particularly, the innocent 
passage of foreign ships could be constrained by the coastal State according to its 
domestic laws for the purpose of safety navigation and pollution prevention.  The 
“design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships” (United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)) could be regulated by the coastal State as 
long as the duly publicized national laws give effect to those generally accepted 
international regulations, inter alia, IMO Treaties.  While assuming the coastal State 
jurisdiction over foreign ships in territorial sea is distinct from that in local ports, it 
implies the significance of domesticating Treaties.  That is, the powers derived from 
particular Treaties could make legitimate restriction upon certain aspects of 
international law, e.g. foreign ships’ right of innocent passage.  Moreover, the 
coastal State is of course entitled to set forth PSC requirements within its “laws 
relating to innocent passage” (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982)), serving as complementary measures to schemes such as sea lane and traffic 
separation, so as to minimize the risks during the passage.  In this sense, Article 21 
itself is eligible for the international legal basis of PSC regime that legitimizes the 
imposition by the coastal State of its national laws which give effect to generally 
accepted international regulations in respect of the design, construction, manning or 
equipment upon foreign ships visiting territorial sea as well as ports under its 
jurisdiction. 
More explicitly, the coastal State is entitled to set out particular conditions for the 
admission of foreign ships going to its internal water or calling at a port; and is 
empowered to “take the necessary steps” (United Nations Convention on the Law of 
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the Sea (1982)) against any violation by ships of those conditions according to 
Article 25 of UNCLOS.  In this respect, the conditions for entry into ports could be 
related by the coastal State to foreign ships’ PSC inspection records within a period 
of time, e.g. last one calendar year.  Once unqualified performance of a ship is 
determined by the coastal State as the first step, refusal of access would be the 
following necessary step when the ship involved makes another call.  Whilst the 
coastal State is satisfied as a result of certain commitment from, e.g. the flag State or 
CSs, the next step would be lifting of the ban and in turn the new PSC inspection 
step commences.  Meanwhile, the coastal State may “suspend temporarily” the 
ongoing innocent passage, as long as it “is essential for” (United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (1982)) security on the viewpoint of the coastal State, 
irrespective of whether actual threat emerges.  This provision has been accurately 
and thoroughly executed by IMO’s ISPS Code as to the requirements for foreign 
ships providing the coastal State relevant information before entry.  In fact, just like 
criteria of “essential” are based on the assessment of the coastal State, the degree to 
which temporary suspension could be applied is determined by the coastal State as 
well.  In this regard, security has been recognized universally as a fully subjective 
assessment by individual sovereign States and could not be interfered with by any 
others in international law sphere. 
The fundamental obligations for the flag State are elaborated in Article 94 of 
UNCLOS.  A series of requirements are stipulated for the purpose of effective 
control over administrative, technical and social affairs relating to ships concerned.  
In particular, aspects listed in Article 94 (3) and (4) overlap with major concerns of 
IMO Treaties, and the principle of conforming to the generally accepted international 
regulations is reaffirmed for the implementation and enforcement of the flag State.  
Noteworthy is (6) which requires the flag State effectively responding to the report 
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from another State on its nonfeasance of duties for properly assuming jurisdiction 
over particular ships flying its flag.  That is, a State in the capacity of the coastal 
State or port State is entitled to detect the defects of foreign ships which could be 
attributed, as per generally accepted international regulations, to the faults of the flag 
State.  It is exactly the standpoint on which current PSC regime takes effect – PSC 
regime came into play as a result of failure of flag States to discharge their duties 
under international law, even though the detection is not expressly an obligation 
under UNCLOS. 
Most explicitly, Part 12 of UNCLOS makes comprehensive arrangements for the 
operation of PSC relating to anti-pollution.  The establishment of international 
regulations and adoption of corresponding national laws on prevention of pollution 
from ships and by dumping are of legal obligations of States Parties to UNCLOS, 
which definitely recognizes at the same time that coastal States have “the right to 
permit, regulate and control” (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982)) such pollution.  In addition, the prevention of pollution from ships could be 
the legitimate premise for coastal States imposing particular entry 
restrictions/conditions upon foreign ships which intend to call local ports, as long as 
that imposition has been duly published and been communicated to IMO.  In this 
sense, coastal States could cooperate on a regional basis under an identical legal 
framework so as to prompt further harmonization of anti-pollution policies and 
enforcement thereof by individual States involved.  This part of UNCLOS has made 
several vital implications.  Firstly, protecting the interests of the coastal State’s 
water areas, from internal waters, territorial sea to continental shelf and exclusive 
economic zone, is of an important issue which shall be taken into account and 
resolved at international level.  In other words, apart from individual measures via 
national legislation, establishment of generally accepted international regulations, i.e. 
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international cooperation, is absolutely necessary.  Framework by UNCLOS for 
anti-pollution is based on the joint efforts from flag States, coastal States, port States 
and international community.  Secondly, the effect of measures taken by individual 
States under national legislation shall not be lower, and is encouraged tacitly to be 
higher, than that under international regulations.  It indicates the compulsory 
requirements under UNCLOS for national legislation in respect of pollution 
prevention to be subject to the generally accepted international regulations, e.g. the 
structure of ships.  Thirdly, almost all particular measures in the light of 
international regulations and national laws could be taken against violation by 
national-flagged and foreign-flagged ships.  Those against foreign ships, e.g. PSC 
regime, could be made as stringent as possible on the basis of anti-pollution.  
Fourthly, the most reasonable approach under UNCLOS to protecting the interests of 
the coastal State so as to facilitate the exercise of sovereignty, lies in giving effect to 
the generally accepted international regulations through the competent international 
organization, i.e. IMO Treaties, within national law system.  It is apparent that apart 
from response to contingency such as marine casualties, the normal and feasible 
regime to prevent pollution from foreign ships is of the direct control by the coastal 
State over those ships whilst they are in local ports.  Requirements could be 
imposed and particular steps could be taken in accordance with international 
regulations and national laws to ensure that pollution threat to water areas has been 
minimized before entry and thereafter.  Fifthly, one of the goals under UNCLOS 
anti-pollution framework is to promote notification to coastal States.  Coastal States 
should be well informed through international cooperation as to occurrence of marine 
casualties which give rise to pollution on their water areas, and emerged risks.  In 
this regard, in addition to report and investigation arrangements for marine casualties 
under IMO Treaties, prevailing regional PSC agreement is of a significant form of 
the notification, which particularly takes effect in the field of risk prevention and 
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control.  Given geographical proximity and timely data update, more efficient and 
effective information exchange could be achieved.  Meanwhile, ships concerned 
would be relieved from unnecessary or duplicated inspections in ports of the same 
region. 
The enforcement plays an essential role in safeguarding compliance.  UNCLOS sets 
out detailed distribution of enforcement obligations among three types of States.  
The ultimate jurisdiction of the flag State over ships flying its flag is reaffirmed 
through establishing an integrated set of explicit obligations.  The port State is 
empowered not only to take actions, including inspections and subsequent institution 
of proceedings, against violation within its water areas by foreign ships, but also to 
investigate the pre-existing violation occurred outside its water areas by those ships 
of call.  At the request of any other State involved, that investigation is transformed 
into a legal commitment.  Notably, instituting proceedings towards pre-existing 
violation could not be taken unless that violation “has caused or is likely to cause 
pollution” (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)) within the port 
State’s water areas.  In this case, it is acceptable to argue that the port State has 
grasped the power to the same extent as the flag State does under UNCLOS.  This is 
because while the flag State is obliged to effective enforcement over a ship flying its 
flag which has committed or is likely to commit a violation of its national laws in 
respect of anti-pollution, the port State is entitled to investigate that violation by the 
same ship once it is voluntarily within a port of that State in the light of international 
regulations to which the flag State’s national laws give effect.  In particular, 
periodic surveys/inspections of the compliance of ships’ actual situation with 
applicable regulations are conducted by both the flag State and the port State.  
Moreover, any port State is entitled to determine, thereby prevent the ship from 
sailing on its own initiative via administrative measures given the violation of the 
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requirements for seaworthiness in respect of design, construction, equipment and 
manning of ships according to Article 219 of UNCLOS, all of which fall exclusively 
under particular domains covered by IMO Treaties.  The port State in practice 
examines the situation of the ships in local ports so as to detect pollution risks.  
“Risk” is of a delicate concept which is incompatible with negligence, thus 
evaluation of risks is inevitably affected by subjectivity and inclusion of uncertainties.  
From the perspective of the port State, a ship with records of violation usually 
warrants tendency of re-committal, whereas this opinion could be precluded by the 
ship’s qualified performance in PSC during a period of time.   Meanwhile, it is hard 
to clearly distinguish anti-pollution investigation from other forms of physical 
inspections because a piece of tiny defect in any field might lead to catastrophic 
consequences according to the theory of chaos, and seaworthiness is deemed a 
standard concerning technical, operational and subjectively estimated respects on the 
common viewpoint of the port State.  In this sense, specific PSC operation features 
under IMO instruments are absolutely compatible with the requirements for port 
State enforcement under UNCLOS. 
Significant respects are stipulated in several provisions of UNCLOS that make 
general direction towards specific PSC operation. 
 Enforcement over foreign ships, including inspections, investigations, and 
institution of proceedings could solely be executed by officials serving the 
Governments – Article 224;  
 Foreign ships shall be treated without discrimination whatsoever during 
enforcement – Article 227; 
 Verification of certificates carried onboard a foreign ship is the start point and 
basic standpoint of any physical inspection.  Those valid certificates shall be 
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recognized being the same effect as those issued by the State exercising 
enforcement, and be deemed the sufficient evidence for the compliance of the 
ship’s actual situation with items on those certificates – Article 217&226. 
 That verification could not be broken through or expanded until warranted by 
“clear grounds” listed – Article 217&226; 
 Unseaworthy ships could be administratively detained and be directed to 
appropriate shipyard for the purpose of anti-pollution.  The release shall be 
conditional, i.e. committed violation has been corrected and threat of damage to 
marine environment has been precluded from those ships – Article 219, 220& 
226; 
 The flag State shall be promptly informed the circumstances as to institution of 
proceedings, inter alia, detentions against its ships – Article 231; 
 Foreign ships targeted shall not entail extra risks in respect of navigation safety 
and anti-pollution as a result of the enforcement – Article 225; 
 Unnecessary physical inspections shall be largely avoided through cooperation 
among States of enforcement – Article 226; and 
 Remedies, e.g. actions in Courts, shall be available on the occasion that damage 
or loss has been suffered as a result of unlawful measures taken by the State of 
enforcement.  In this case, that State is liable for those damages or losses – 
Article 232; 
All in all, principles of PSC run through the framework of UNCLOS in respect of the 
enforcement by the flag State, the coastal State and the port State.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to summarize that under UNCLOS, PSC regime should be deemed the 
power of enforcement by both the coastal State and the port State which are closely 
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interrelated.  In other words, PSC is initially of an approach as the coastal State 
enforcement to preventing pollution damage within its water areas, and the violation 
to which the damage or potential damage is totally attributable could be investigated 
by the port State as port State enforcement in accordance with the generally accepted 
international regulations. 
2.6 No More Favorable Treatment 
It is notable that the principle of “no more favorable treatment” is clarified within 
IMO Treaties of SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW and AFS.  It indicates that ships of 
States non-Parties to those Treaties when in ports of States Parties would undergo the 
inspections in accordance with higher treaty standards compared with present rules 
applied to those ships.  It appears not impartial at the first sight.  Principle of 
“Pacta sunt servanda” makes States Parties be bound by a particular treaty in force, 
whereas “a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without 
its consent” (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)).  Relevant 
precedents could be found under case law – the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
between Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark, and between Federal Republic 
of Germany and Netherlands respectively by International Court of Justice (ICJ, 
1969).  In this case, claims of Denmark and Netherlands as to application of 
equidistance principle regulated in Article 6 of Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf were dismissed by the Court since Federal Republic of Germany 
who had not ratified that Convention should not be bound by it.  However, whilst a 
treaty reflects customary international law, i.e. it reiterates or codifies peremptory 
international norms, non-Parties should be bound.  Treaty Convention accepts this 
idea through applying the principle of “jus cogens” and deemed peremptory 
international norms “accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm” (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)) 
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which could by no means be derogated.  International norms are in fact a critical 
source of international law.  Undoubtedly, behavioral pattern becomes a norm as a 
result of general practice among States for a relatively long period of time, and those 
peremptory norms exactly hit the bottom line of overall international community.  
In this sense, consideration should be made on whether principles and particulars in 
IMO Treaties constitute peremptory international norms.  Proponents might base 
their arguments on the overwhelming significance of human life and the sea as lose 
of life at any corner of the world, including at sea shall be prevented whatsoever; and 
the sea which constitutes paramount resource for the survival and living of mankind 
has been too vulnerable to undergo any further damage, e.g. pollution from ships.  
Meanwhile, key IMO Treaties have been practiced by States parities for several 
decades and experienced continuous revise in order to meet practical needs, and have 
been generally accepted by the international shipping community as a whole.  
Nonetheless, imposing of intervention or sanction as per particular Treaties owning 
to the violation of peremptory international norms, e.g. detaining ships of States 
non-Parties to SOLAS in accordance with relevant provisions of SOLAS, seems 
questionable.  In other words, violation of peremptory international norms by 
individual States would lead to universal blame, rather than inevitable sanctions 
derived from particular treaty regulations.  Furthermore, major problems haunt 
international shipping community yet, inter alia, non-fulfillment of treaty duties by 
signatories of flag States, and pursuance by individual owners/operators of operating 
ships below the minimum conventional standards.  In fact, the implementation and 
enforcement of IMO Treaties at international level is quite far away from general and 
uniform practice among States since various features including economy and politics 
are affecting the performance of those actors.  IMO is still on its way for effective 
solution.  In this regard, this paper concludes that requirements under IMO Treaties 
do not constitute peremptory international norms in international law sphere.  The 
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enforcement, nevertheless, of “no favorable treatment” seems feasible.  The reason 
lies not only in inviting a fraction of States Parties to UNCLOS but have not ratified 
relevant IMO Treaties to actively participate the international work of preserving 
marine environment and protecting safety of life at sea, but also implying that given 
no privilege for non-Parties, requirements for Parties would be inevitably and 
progressively strengthened.  Furthermore, the enforcement of “no favorable 
treatment” makes another significant implication as to the tendency of international 
legislation.  Traditionally, the process on transforming a set of behavioral patterns 
into international or multilateral Treaties is subject to the sequence that following the 
practice of certain States for a period of time, the pattern is accepted as law by those 
States. When being developed and generally practiced within international 
community, international norms or customary laws are established; Treaties then are 
established to reiterate those norms.  However, a contemporary treaty refers to “an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law” (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)), which 
indicates that rather than codification of international norms, a treaty nowadays is of 
the compromise or agreement recognized among negotiating or contesting States.  
According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the international laws 
could be stemmed from international Treaties, international custom, general principle 
of laws and judicial decisions (UN, 1945).  Therefore, the international Treaties and 
general international law make mutual promotion.  Despite the difficulty of setting 
up definite constitutional hierarchy within international law system vis-à-vis 
domestic laws, international Treaties constitute the prime source of international law.  
In this sense, the international order in modern world is inclined to be maintained and 
developed by treaty laws under globalization.  This consideration has been taken by 
IMO in IMO Convention which recognizes that certain areas are “incapable of 
settlement through the normal processes of international shipping business” so that 
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they shall be given priority as “the subject of direct negotiations between the 
Members concerned” (Convention on the International Maritime Organization 
(1948)).  Not only IMO Treaties, but UNCLOS itself is also with the nature of 
treaty law in spite of codification of certain international norms.  The port State 
jurisdiction under UNCLOS mentioned above is of extra-ordinary and far-reaching 
power which could be exercised without consideration of the actual needs or requests 
of the flag State or coastal State concerned, even though preliminary and generalized 
PSC regime had emerged within certain IMO Treaties, e.g. SOLAS 1927, prior to 
UNCLOS (Özçayır, 2001).  Noteworthy is the fact that establishment and 
development of treaty laws take response to the urgent needs within certain domains, 
inter alia, protection of marine environment and safety of life at sea since they reflect, 
or take into account, the common needs and values of the international community 
which could not be satisfied so far through the practice of individual States.  In this 
sense, IMO law-making Treaties would significantly take effect. 
Other two aspects as to no discrimination and compensation of undue delay which 
are highlighted in this paper will be discussed in the following section. 
3. Port State Control in Practice 
Generally, PSC is derived from the practical needs of port State Governments for the 
authority powerful enough to control foreign ships so as to prevent ships with major 
defects from actual operation, thereby safeguard safety at sea.   
In May 1993, A Panamax dry bulk carrier “San Marco” was detained by the 
Canadian Coast Guard as a result of physical inspection which identified severe 
defects of the ship in respect of its structure, fire-fighting and life-saving.  
Approximately one month later, the ship was released at the request of its owner, 
and went to sea for trade with valid Class certificates justified its good situation as a 
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result of new Class inspection but without any repair or relevant recommendation 
for rectification.  Consequently, the ship en route involved in a severe structural 
damage on shell plating leading to total incapability of navigation.  Despite another 
detention, the ship subsequently was sold for scrapping since no owner would like 
to cover the huge expense for repairing (Özçayır, 2001).  In this case, although 
owners and Classification Societies concerned failed to ensure safety, major 
drawbacks within international ship control system lie with that legal power is not 
available for Canadian Coast Guard to constrain follow-up movement of that ship 
after identification of deficiencies.  In other words, follow-up measures Canadian 
Coast Guard desired the vessel to take, e.g. local repairing, were not codified by any 
international regulation.   
3.1 The Regime 
Nowadays, States Parties to IMO Treaties have grasped strong power for control 
over foreign ships voluntarily in their ports so that fewer ships like San Marco could 
operate without satisfying rectification.  It is absolutely of an improvement within 
international ship control system.  Notably, the purpose of PSC regime lies not 
only in the creation of a complementary measure against failure of the flag State, but 
also in establishing enforcement of IMO itself.  As a special agency of UN, IMO is 
unable to exercise the enforcement by itself over flag States and individual ships.  
This is because the establishment of IMO enforcement force is not feasible due to 
fiscal consideration, and IMO staff would be under no condition permitted to board 
any commercial ship for physical inspection.  However, the general practice of 
PSC from the perspective of a flag State seems equivalent to the enforcement of 
IMO who initiated the regime, even though the enforcement is specifically executed 
by its members.  In this regard, all States members to IMO exercising PSC 
constitute IMO’s enforcement force since they ratified IMO Treaties – this is a 
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typical case revealing the successful utilization of treaty law to establish 
international order. 
Stephen D. Krasner in 1982 defined an international regime as “implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1982).  
This is accurate enough to describe the situation of contemporary PSC regime.  The 
area of international relations concerned in a broad sense is the shipping community 
in which States participate; and particularly, it lies with specific relations derived 
from ship-related incidents such as marine casualties among individual States.  In 
this case, willingness of different States is intersected, i.e. preventing the 
reoccurrence whatsoever.  Achievement of that prevention primarily depends on the 
application of substantive and procedural regulations of States involved so as to 
support decision-making.  Once consistency among national laws has been 
established, the general willingness could be achieved.  In this regard, international 
laws come into play.  Current PSC regime derived from treaty laws constitutes an 
influential international actor who is able to exert virtual impacts towards individual 
States and owners/operators.  In this regard, while the PSC is exercised on the basis 
of territorial jurisdiction, the PSC regime in international law sphere is independent 
of State sovereign. 
3.2 Substandard Ships 
The notion of “substandard ships” has been utilized in PSC-related legislation as the 
object of elimination by IMO instruments and laws of European Union (EU laws).  
The definition of “substandard ships” has been clarified in IMO Resolution of 
Procedures for Port State Control, 2011 (Procedure 2011) that refers to ships not 
complying with relevant IMO Treaties in respect of both such hardware as 
construction and software of shipboard operation by crewmembers.  However, 
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given IMO law-making Treaties discussed above, the notion of “substandard ships” 
could solely be used among international rule-makers who determine the quality of 
“standard”.  In other words, ratification of law-making treaties do not constitute 
absolute compliance, thus the notion of “substandard ships” could not be imposed 
upon fleet of flag States unless those States give full effect to, or perfectly 
implement, relevant treaties.  The notion of “eradicating all substandard ships”, 
likewise, appears not practicable and could be retained only as a slogan.  While it 
is undoubted that certain businessmen within the shipping community still make 
their ships of non-compliance at minimum operable level by virtue of ignoring or 
neglecting safety of life at sea and risks of pollution, the fact that ships are subject to 
administration of their flag States would not change whatsoever as long as the 
existence of ship registry mechanism, combined with the tendency that major flag 
States are endeavoring to, where appropriate, recover the control of ships owned by 
their nationals which currently get registry in other States by means of modifying 
national registry laws.  In this regard, control on ships by flag States would be 
further strengthened and the degree to which those ships meet the generally 
accepted standards primarily depends on the extent to which flag States give effect 
to those standards, including both implementation and enforcement.  Given the 
variance on available resources of economy, technology and human, States Parties 
to IMO Treaties would discharge the treaty duties in different ways in accordance 
with the optimal strategic planning.  For instance, State A would focus mainly on 
local security in the capacity of the port State given its paramount status within 
international economy, while State B assesses its major role as the flag State such 
that relatively weakens PSC in order for economic development.  Eradicating of all 
substandard vessels therefore is impossible under the jurisdiction of both flag State 
and port State as long as the circumstance of disparate development exists.   While 
PSC is of course a strong medicine as it focuses directly on realistic operators and 
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actual performance of ships in ports, the individual compliance or non-compliance 
could not be deemed the unique criterion for flag States’ performance.  In response, 
IMO launched the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme concentrating 
directly on almost all respects of its member States’ performance in accordance with 
relevant IMO Treaties.  In the foreseeable future, therefore, substandard States 
would emerge in addition to substandard ships/owners. 
3.3 PSC Cooperation 
PSC regime under international law is initially of a type of international cooperation.  
That is, the port State examining compliance of foreign ships with international 
standards in order to maintain the order of international shipping exactly constitutes 
cooperation with flag States whose flag ships in port is entitled to fly. 
Another prevailing scheme under the auspices of IMO is of the inter-governmental 
agreements on PSC, i.e. Memorandum of Understandings, represented by Paris 
MoU developing through European Union legislations.  European Union (EU) is 
of an economic and political union that operates via a series of independent and 
supranational institutions, and makes decisions by means of intergovernmental 
negotiation.  Among those institutions, European Parliament (EP) exercises 
legislative function together with Council of European Union (the Council) and 
European Commission (EC).  While EC as executive body is especially 
responsible for proposal of legislation, EP, as well as the Council, takes charge of 
deliberation and subsequent issuance of relevant Directives.  In this sense, an 
effective and efficient legislative system for investigation, proposal, consideration 
and decision-making has been established, and in turn policy taking into account of 
interests of member States as a whole could be implemented and enforced at EU 
level. 
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Basic principles within the Paris MoUs could be concluded as: 
 All Governments of member States give effect to the agreement; 
 All foreign ships are targeted and inspected without discrimination as to flag; 
 Physical inspections are accurately based on the scope laid down in applicable 
Treaties; 
 Purpose of enforcement is to ensure compliance of all ships of call;  
 Flag States are obliged to ensure compliance of their ships by periodic survey 
while port States are entitled to continuous monitoring of compliance;  
 The Companies/owners/operators assume prime obligations of maintenance for 
compliance; and 
 Timely information exchange and maintenance makes benefit for all Parties 
within the region (Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 
(2013)). 
In this sense, success of MoUs depends on firstly, proportionate degree of economic 
development or the consistent economic interests or political strategy among Parties; 
secondly general uniformity in respect of implementation, interpretation and 
enforcement of relevant treaties.   
It is notable that the scope of inspection within regional agreements, especially Paris 
MoU should be construed in a broader sense.  That is, more stringent requirements 
for ship particulars based on treaties “minimum standards” are likely to be adopted 
by EU within the Paris MoU region and be enforced upon foreign ships since the 
ultimate goal of IMO Treaties is to guarantee “safety navigation and clean oceans”.  
Meanwhile, the port State shall take measures necessary to prevent marine pollution 
as per UNCLOS.  In this regard, any step towards this purpose would be approved 
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and legitimate in international law sphere.  In fact, requirements of “clear grounds” 
stipulated in UNCLOS and IMO Treaties for further inspections after verification of 
certificates carried on board by the port State give rise to the enforcement of 
foregoing more stringent requirements or higher standards.  It is evident from the 
Directive 2009_16_EC which reads PSC inspection “is not a survey and relevant 
inspections forms are not seaworthiness certificates” (Directive (2009)).  This 
statement makes two strong assertions.  Firstly, it partially denies the completeness 
of the Flag State Control through survey, and the corresponding faults should be 
corrected by port States.  Secondly, verification of certificates is broken through at 
the outset of a physical inspection.  That is, while UNCLOS and relevant IMO 
Treaties regulate that forms of PSC inspection should be limited to documentation 
unless there are clear grounds warranting further detection, PSC inspection of EU 
members initially lies on detecting of those clear grounds.  In other words, mere 
validity of certificates which should be accepted as evidence for compliance could 
not satisfy an effective PSC inspection within EU region.  Notably, whilst a PSC 
inspection questions the conformity of one foreign ship’s actual situation with those 
attested by relevant certificates, the effectiveness of certification by the port State is 
queried as well, at least the possibility of similar failure or negligence might exist 
in the port State’s administration.  Therefore, ships flying the flag of State A 
which apply more stringent standards to ships of State B in PSC inspection would 
undergo examinations with similar forms in ports of State B.  This reveals the 
general principle of reciprocity concerning international relations which also takes 
effect in the remedy for undue delay of ships as a result of PSC inspection.  In this 
sense, an argument could be made that the general establishment of regional PSC 
agreements following Paris MoU is of a necessary response to rigorous PSC system 
of Paris MoU. 
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Moreover, “no discrimination as to flag” makes no sense on the viewpoint of EU 
legislation.  Directive 2009_16_EC explicitly illustrates the failure of flag States 
and ROs thereof as “there has been a serious failure on the part of a number of flag 
States” (EU, 2009) to properly fulfill commitment of international law.  In addition, 
EU legislation definitely relates those ships posing extra danger to safety and 
environment to the performance of their flag States.  In this case, “white, grey and 
black list” scheme of flag States derived from Paris MoU practice for the purpose of 
“name and shame” gains legitimate status.  This is the case of deviation of PSC 
practice from “no discrimination” which indicates fair treatment.  From the 
perspective of international rule-makers such as UN and IMO, clarification of “no 
discrimination” principle is absolutely necessary since they are shaping an industry 
that constitutes the cornerstone of international transportation which refers to 
political, commercial and financial interests of actors within the community.  
However, the fact of long-lasting unqualified performance of those actors indicates 
that effective implementation and enforcement of international regulations at the 
global scale is hard to achieve – various aspects are making barriers, including 
strategies of individual States, profit consideration, resource limit, etc.  In this 
sense, Paris MoU supplies a relatively effective solution which covers flag States, 
port States and owners/operators.  That is,  
 Applying more stringent standards to all ships of call in order to minimize the 
gap between treaty standards and the minimum operable level of particular ships; 
 Relating performance of individual ships to trade opportunity of their 
owners/operators, i.e. consequence of non-compliance may be of detention, refusal 
of access or expulsion from port; 
 Relating performance of individual ships to international reputation of their flag 
States, i.e. “name and shame”; and 
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 Establishing and developing an uniform legal framework to ensure consistency 
of implementation and enforcement among member States. 
In this sense, the general establishment of regional PSC agreements all over the 
world is supported by IMO without hesitation.  It was confirmed by IMO 
Resolution in 1991 that the Paris MoU made “important contribution to maritime 
safety, and prevention of pollution and the operation of substandard ships” (IMO, 
1991).  Therefore, the Paris MoU was deemed a model and other States Parties 
were invited to establish regional agreements under the auspices of the Paris MoU 
members.  The regional PSC agreement is consistent with the principle of 
cooperation laid down in UNCLOS, IMO Convention and other particular IMO 
Treaties; meanwhile, it encourages those States which reveal ineffective 
implementation or enforcement of international regulations to make progress in a 
more acceptable regional sphere. 
Nonetheless, the Paris MoU could be definitely distinguished from other existing 
MoUs.  Tokyo MoU reads “each Authority will apply those relevant instruments 
which are in force and are binding upon it” (Memorandum of Understanding on Port 
State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region (2013)).  That is, States non-parities to a 
particular IMO Treaty would not examine the compliance of ships with that treaty 
which is likely to be relevant for other members.  Meanwhile, the cost of 
rectification of defects identified in PSC inspection and FSC survey, has to be 
covered by ship-owners’ cost.  Whilst their ships are delayed, huge financial loss 
and subsequent contractual disputes would arise.  Therefore, owners have to take 
into account the fiscal advantages before determining the flag of registry, the 
Company of management and ports of call.  In this case, flag and port of 
convenience emerge in response of practical needs of owners.  Owing to the lack 
of uniform legislation, inconsistency of implementation and enforcement emerges 
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inevitably and thereby the circumstance of “port of convenience” would be more or 
less retained.  In contrast, member States of Paris MoU who are EU members are 
subject to EU legislation which could give effect to international regulations and EU 
requirements so that the implementation and enforcement of both pre-existing and 
created higher standards could be exercised in a consistent manner to ensure 
effective and efficient administration of foreign ships.  Consequently, ships of 
non-compliance would be no place to hide. 
The “Volgoneft-248” (the ship) case specifically emphasizes the significance of 
utilization of PSC regime and of PSC cooperation at regional basis.  The ship is an 
oil tanker built in 1975, flying the flag of Russia and owned by a Russian domestic 
entity.  On December 29th, 1999, the ship loaded at Bulgaria a few days earlier 
involved in severe structural damage and broke into two pieces off a Turkish port in 
the Marmara Sea whilst anchoring and waiting for unloading (Otay, 2000).  
Despite the severe storm at that time, pre-existing defects of the ship, particularly 
those relating to hull strength were uncovered, thereby faults of ship control 
authorities, including the flag State and the two port States should be seriously taken 
into consideration.  The overall situation of a ship should be under the control of its 
flag State through surveys, so that relevant professional advice or compulsory orders 
in respect of safety navigation could be in place.  Since defects concerning hull 
strength which is too severe to maintain ship’s integrity could not be attributed to 
faults of onboard crewmembers in respect of their daily routine of maintenance, it is 
reasonable to argue that the flag State of Russia failed to properly exercise 
jurisdiction or enforce its laws over the ship, or the owner/operator disregarded 
relevant directions from the flag State.  While the law enforcement of the flag State 
could not be intervened by any other State, Bulgaria and Turkey who became IMO 
member State in 1960 and 1958 respectively (IMO, 2013b) could make use of PSC 
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regime elaborated in IMO Treaties so as to prevent the ship from damage.  In this 
sense, it is apparent that PSC authority of Bulgaria exhibited totally ineffective PSC 
mechanism, failing to implement IMO Treaties or to enforce national laws, even 
though its water areas were not contaminated as a result of the casualty, compared 
with pollution damage on coastline of Turkey.  Status of Turkey in this case, 
meanwhile, is quite distinctive as the ship was not in its port but in anchorage when 
accident occurred, and Turkey has not ratified UNCLOS up to now (UN, 2013).  
The Bosphorus Strait Turkey borders is of the sole water connection between the 
Black Sea and the Marmara Sea, thus seaborne trade of States surrounding the Black 
Sea is absolutely based on the Strait.  UNCLOS confers States bordering straits 
used for international navigation, e.g. the Bosphorus Strait, power to adopt and 
enforce national legislation over foreign ships conducting transit passage in 
accordance with UNCLOS and other applicable international regulations so as to 
ensure safety navigation and combat marine pollution.  Combined with the 
far-reaching power of port State jurisdiction discussed above, therefore, such States 
as Turkey could utilize several approaches under UNCLOS to tackling with the ship 
before casualty took place.  Regretfully, Turkey is not yet the signatory of 
UNCLOS, thus aforesaid approaches by Turkey in the Bosphorus Strait could be 
refused by foreign ships.  Nonetheless, PSC regime laid down in SOLAS 74, 
STCW 78, Annex /  of MARPOL 73/78 respectively Ⅰ Ⅱ which Turkey has ratified 
could be properly utilized by Turkey, especially through regional cooperation, in 
order to prevent casualty.  It is easy to envisage that once Turkey and Bulgaria had 
been in close PSC cooperation under regional agreement, even bilateral contract 
which ensures that all ships calling ports of contracting Parties should undergo PSC 
in accordance with specific requirements of the generally applicable international 
regulations or of the agreement, it was far likely that the ship was detained with 
conditional release at the loading port of Bulgaria.  Whilst the ship was en route to 
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Turkey, information on the poor situation of the ship was circulated from PSC 
authority of Bulgaria.  Turkey authority was in turn able to take measures 
necessary in a timely manner, at least notifying the ship on the circumstances of 
severe storm and rough sea, or suggesting the ship through competent authority of 
Bulgaria to take temporary stand-by at loading port for weather improvement.  
This reaffirms the importance of information exchange at inter-jurisdictional level in 
respect of all relevant particulars of certain ships.  In other words, information 
should be exchanged irrespective of ships trading in or out of any jurisdiction within 
the region.  Comfortingly, the framework of this cooperation has been established 
through the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Black Sea 
signed in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2000, which covers all the three States involved in this 
case.   
3.4 Classification of Deficiencies 
Establishment of deficiencies justifies the necessity of PSC regime; and 
deficiencies of substantial non-compliance give rise to intervention.  While the 
general classification of deficiencies of ships in PSC is primarily pertaining to 
technical categorization, e.g. list of deficiency codes, this paper divides deficiencies 
into two major types – Class-related and Safe Manning from the perspective of a 
PSC authority. 
PSC inspections examines overall situation of foreign-flagged ships in respect of 
safety navigation, pollution prevention, and welfare of crew covered by generally 
accepted international regulations.  Notably, one domain that shall be seriously 
taken into account by both the flag and the port State is ship’s manning which 
essentially influences the effective enforcement in foregoing three general fields.  
SOLAS has encompassed “ships’ manning” requiring generally that all ships shall 
“be sufficiently and efficiently manned” and carry onboard “a minimum safety 
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manning document” (SOLAS, 1980).  Since this document is issued by the flag 
State, the evaluation of “sufficient and efficient manning” shall be duly exercised 
by the flag State.  In particular, abovementioned SOLAS provision relates 
principles of safe manning to relevant IMO Assembly Resolution A.1047 (27) 
adopted in 2011.  Safety manning is a very much broad issue involving a variety 
of respects onboard a ship.  This paper argues that, rather than construction, 
structure and equipment consisting of ships’ hardware that certified by the flag 
State, which comprise the object of onboard operation, all others respects could be 
classified within scope of “safe manning” emphasizing the seafarers.  This is 
because, as A.1047 (27) reads, safe manning is “a function of the number of 
qualified and experienced seafarers necessary for the safety and security of the ship, 
crew, passengers, cargo and property and for the protection of marine 
environment” (IMO, 2011a).  While sentence above is definitely enough to mirror 
reality, Table 2 is for detailed analysis. 
Table 2 – Safe manning related aspects 
Regarding seafarers Quality Proof/Effect 
Number Sufficient 
Minimum Safety Manning 
document 
Qualification Competent STCW Certificates 
Operation Proficient 
Safety Management System 
regarding training & instructions 
Practice Experienced
Safety Management System 
regarding training & instructions 
Performance Qualified 
Safety and security of ship, crew, 
cargo; and pollution prevention 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Apart from those attested by relevant certificates or documents, all other outcomes 
listed above should be achieved by seafarers through operation.  It is notable that 
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firstly, maintenance of a sufficient number of seafarers and competency/proficiency 
thereof need both survey by the flag State and auditing/monitoring by the 
owners/managers.  While the former may be conducted alternatively by CSs as 
Recognized Organizations, the latter could be attained by virtue of effective 
enforcement of onboard Safety Management System.  Secondly, seafarers’ 
welfare is of an influential factor as the ship is of both workplace and living room 
for seamen.  This is the reason for inclusion of relevant ILO Conventions in 
addition to STCW Code.  Increasing attention has been paid upon living and 
working conditions for seafarers.  In this respect, mandate of ISM Code and 
operation inspections prevailing in current PSC regime is very much reasonable 
from the perspective of integral safety.  Moreover, a system ship in general 
comprises parts of machinery and human, as well as those of management 
institutions going across for coordination or integration.  Since the manning level 
is determined exclusively by flag States perhaps pursuant to relevant IMO 
Resolutions, defects relating to safe manning are usually made eventual attribution 
to, rather than “unsafe manning”, non-proficiency or non-competence of 
crewmembers as a result of operation examination.  The reason lies in the fact that 
it makes no sense for a PSC authority, once deficiencies being identified, alleging 
directly failure of the State whose flag the ship inspected is flying.  Therefore, 
owners/the Companies defined in ISM Code of the ship have to taken prime 
responsibility for safe manning in practice. 
It is vital for a PSC authority to accurately and timely ascertain Parties, rather than 
crewmembers on board, which take responsibility to, and are able to rectify or 
make contribution to rectify defects of inspected ship.  In fact, in addition to the 
punishment directly upon the Master as per port State domestic law, intervention 
actions such as suspension of cargo operation and detention by PSC authority have 
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no influence on crewmembers.  In other words, since ships are injected huge 
financial value derived from the seaborne trade, those interventions are actually of 
great influence over owners/charterers.  Meanwhile, problems such as port 
congestion probably arise in local areas as a result of intervention.  In this sense, 
since the normal is of “berthing – operation – departure”, “invasion” of intervention 
has to be removed as far as practicable without prejudice to the achievement of 
purpose set forth in applicable international and domestic laws.  Once deficiencies 
giving rise to intervention, they normally could not be properly corrected solely 
through the efforts of crew, i.e. the ability or commitment of crewmembers has 
been deeply questioned or negatively assessed by PSC authority which could not be 
satisfied unless the participation of other relevant interested Parties.  The 
significance of CSs in safeguarding safety and anti-pollution at sea has been 
recognized by current PSC authorities around the world.  Procedure 2011 clarifies 
the duty of PSC authority as to informing relevant Parties such as flag States and 
CSs immediately after detention being imposed (IMO, 2011b).  CSs, given their 
technical competence, and more importantly, RO status for certification of certain 
shipboard respects are capable of making feasible proposal or commitment, from 
the view point of “manager”, on the basis of mutual consultation so as to lift the 
ban.  Likewise, once deficiencies concerning safe manning such as operational 
defects are identified, correction in site by committed individuals is insufficient for 
future compliance, e.g. proficiency/competence cannot be promoted in such a short 
period of time.  At this point, active participation of CSs/the Companies who 
actually take charge of safe manning of individual ships is reasonable, e.g. revising 
of running shipboard SMS may satisfy PSC authority and may thereby transform 
the detention to rectification within a period of time.  After all, solutions by flag 
States are quite far away from reality. 
 35
Procedure 2011 lists 72 certificates and documents covering various respects of a 
ship which would be checked during PSC inspection.  Residues beyond foregoing 
two categories inevitably emerge since distinct situations of individual ships.  For 
instance, such circumstances as no-class ships, the flag State without ROs, ships 
below convention size and ships flying the flag of non-Parties may lead to 
difficulties in satisfying the PSC authority or correcting defects warranting severe 
interventions.  In response, establishing explicit substantive and procedural rules 
through national legislation is tightly interrelated with effectiveness and efficiency 
of PSC inspections.   
3.5 Classification Societies 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the essence of PSC regime refers to the 
enforcement of both the port State and the flag State.  While the focus of the 
former should be generally on ship safety and anti-pollution, concerns of the latter 
could be reasonably expanded to safeguarding of interests of all national 
stakeholders.  Apart from ship-owners/operators, one of the stakeholders is 
national maritime equipment manufacturers who are active in shipping industry and 
play a fundamental role on safety and anti-pollution at sea.  Those entities in fact 
take full charge of furnishing a ship with their products, from various equipments to 
huge blocks which should be certified by competent authority of the flag State; and 
equally importantly, with technical services regarding installation, commissioning, 
debugging, maintenance and repairing.  Those products and services account for 
an absolute majority of the value of a made-up ship, and those entities as a whole in 
Europe is evaluated as “the most important employer in the maritime industry” 
since they provide large amount of occupations and turnover (European, 2005). 
However, it is not hard to envisage the consequences of an initially non-effective 
Oil/Water Separator provided by those manufacturers.  This is the reason for the 
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statutory certification of those products and qualification of those services by the 
States whose ships are equipped.  Therefore, great attention has been paid on the 
performance of CSs, which constitutes one significant ship targeting factor prior to 
field inspection.  Almost all Governments of flag States nominate certain CSs – 
given their technical competence – to conduct certification of onboard equipments 
and services in accordance with its own Class Rules for ships engaged in both 
international and domestic voyages.  However, once several CSs concurrently 
certify within the same field, e.g. one piece of equipment, a manufacturer desiring 
to place its products onto market is likely to undergo several certification processes 
so as to meet individual Class Rules.  From the perspective of a manufacturer, it is 
of course a typical waste of resources which ought to be utilized for further 
innovation.  Undoubtedly, CSs have achieved great development in respect of 
both technology and internal quality management; and IACS is endeavoring to 
upgrade Class Rules to a higher and more harmonized level.  Nonetheless, 
foregoing development and efforts appear not adequate to satisfy the urgent need of 
certain interested bodies within maritime sector, e.g. EU member States.  In this 
case EU enacted Regulations accompanied by Maritime Equipment Directives 
providing for detailed standards for ship inspection and survey organizations, and 
regulating relevant activities of maritime administrations.  Therefore, two major 
solutions have been established at EU level.  Firstly, technical development of 
different CSs concerned according to IMO Treaties should be driven by legal 
power by virtue of harmonization of technical rules applicable to marine equipment 
industry.  Secondly, CSs shall set out conditions for mutual recognition of 
certificates issued respectively on the basis of periodic consultation in pursuit of 
consistent interpretation of applicable treaties and maintenance of rules-related 
equivalence.  Given the serious consideration upon Class performance, 
categorization of “Class-related deficiencies” could not be neglected.  In response, 
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this type of “two-pronged” mechanism for the enhancement of Class performance 
is hopeful to take effect, i.e. harmonized national legislation and Class Rules could 
be established and continuously reviewed through continual and interactive 
cooperation pattern of “CS ↔ CS ↔ Government”, so as to meet the up-to-date 
and higher safety standards.  As a result, application of more stringent standards at 
regional level could be achieved through the active participation of CSs.  Notably, 
there have been far more casualties in maritime context than that in aviation sector.  
The reasons lie with  
 Airplanes are merely of workshop for flight crew whereas a vessel is both 
workplace and home for seamen; 
 Formal cooperation between national Authorities in the topic of harmonization 
of technical standards has been conducted for more than two decades.   
In this regard, the compatibility of technical rules derived from different CSs on the 
basis of uniform IMO Treaties makes prime contribution to good enforcement at 
the international level. 
Up to now, China PSC has been at a relatively high level in terms of 
professionalism and technicality embodied in PSCOs.  Meanwhile, ships flying 
flag of China reveal progressively improving PSC records during the last decade, as 







Table 3 – PSC inspection data for China flag under Tokyo MoU 
Year 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
No. of inspections 685 673 694 690 798 804 851 899 904 811 
No. of deficiencies 1750 2013 1933 2354 2337 2048 2235 2513 2960 2919 
No. of detentions 1 8 7 11 7 6 7 15 15 14 
No. of deficiencies 2.55 2.99 2.79 3.39 2.93 2.55 2.63 2.80 3.27 3.60 
% of Detention 0.15 1.19 1.01 1.59 0.88 0.75 0.82 1.67 1.66 1.73%
Source: China Maritime Administration. (2011, January). 2011 Annual PSC Report. Dalian, Author. 
It is primarily due to the good enforcement of current national laws, combined with 
great efforts by individual ship-owners and managers.  However, there is still 
room for improvement.  China Maritime Administration has effectively 
cooperated with China Classification Society (CCS) in technical legislation, 
outcome of which falls within Regulations of Construction for Ships that drafted by 
CCS, deliberated and promulgated by China MSA.  Acting on behalf of Chinese 
Government, CCS holds the leading position amongst ROs, and plays an essential 
role in statutory certification for China-registered ships.  In addition, CCS has 
established a series of rules concerning the classification survey, and has taken up 
surveys for many ships exclusively engaged in domestic voyages under the 
auspices of China MSA.  This is a significant step towards promoting the safety 
level of all ships under jurisdiction that indicates proper interpretation and 
enforcement of applicable laws.  Nevertheless, given the overriding position held 
by CCS, few opportunities for further improvement are available, i.e. lack of formal 
consultation with other CSs.  Assessing implementation and enforcement of IMO 
Treaties by China in the capacity of flag State might be left to IMO, while 
PSC-related issues are the case.  In this regard, suggestions below are listed in 
accordance with EU experiences. 
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 Statutory audit scheme with explicit criteria as to the functioning of internal 
quality system of CCS could be established to ensure that missions are 
accomplished and the active status is properly maintained for technical research; 
 As per periodic PSC statistics, CSs and deficiencies thereof identified in 
physical inspections are available.  Therefore, CSs with qualified performance in 
respect of ship structure such as strength and stability; machinery such as engines 
and steering gear; and shipboard equipments including life-saving and those for 
such special cargo as oil and chemicals could be deemed “preliminarily acceptable 
organizations” with which CCS could consult; 
 The outcome of the consultation should be submitted to China MSA 
periodically, in order to ascertain “acceptable organizations”; 
 As per the outcome, ships carried onboard certificates issued by acceptable 
organizations could be rewarded with less frequent detailed inspections in relevant 
fields.  This is a scheme that conducting by CS surveyor team inspections towards 
class-related items prior to ships entering into ports, or inspections without specific 
ships in the broader sense;   
Therefore, both CCS and MSA could review and improve their regulations and 
rules through consultation in order to facilitate application; resources in PSC could 
be saved; and the competitiveness of national marine equipment manufacturers in 
international market could be enhanced owing to accurate application of 
international standards.   Notably, while various IMO Treaties provide for 
minimum standards for safety and anti-pollution, CSs concentrate on, within the 
scope of those treaties, establishing higher applicable rules via technical research 
and field survey.  Therefore, endeavor to improve national legislations and Class 
Rules, both of which are interconnected in maritime sector, in respect of 
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substantive and procedural provisions is of urgent mission for China MSA.  
Meanwhile, enforcement of foregoing scheme shall be without prejudice to any 
professional judgments in site by PSCOs because of the uncertainties stemmed 
from Human Factors.  And, general principle for identifying Class-related 
deficiencies lies in “being responsible for areas covered within certificates issued 
by them”. 
3.6 Port State Control Officers 
PSC inspections are conducted by PSCOs employed by competent authority of the 
port State, and the boarding of PSCOs gives rise to the establishment of 
administrative relationship.  According to the general principles of administrative 
law, while the flag State takes the ultimate responsibilities for the compliance of their 
ships in foreign ports, it is not deemed the eligible subject under administrative law 
of the port State.  Therefore, within administrative relationship through PSC 
inspections, the subjects are the port State Government and the owner/operator by 
whom the right of control and obligation of compliance are undertaken respectively. 
PSCOs play a significant role in achieving the consistency of PSC inspections at 
international level.  In this regard, it is necessary to introduce a set of criteria or 
lessons as to the generally good practice of PSCOs and to invite port States to use for 
reference in their training programs.  Following a joint Paris MoU & Tokyo MoU 
Ministerial meeting in Canada, this approach was introduced by Port State Control 
Committee of PMoU and has been annexed to Procedure 2011.  It is an important 
step by IMO towards regional PSC cooperation.  Just like the importance of the 
constant consciousness of the Master, who generally represents the ship-owner, on 
his/her overriding power and responsibilities within the shipboard SMS, PSCOs 
being in daily contact with shipping community should bear in mind that carrying out 
inspections is to discharge the statutory duty, and his/her judgment might greatly 
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influence the business of the owner/charterer.  In other words, PSC is of a power for 
port State but duty for PSCOs employed by State government; power of PSCOs, i.e. 
discretion based on expertise, is relative and shall be subject to domestic law.  In 
this sense, regulating basic respects of integrity, professionalism and transparency, as 
well as the way of conducting inspections and handling disagreements is beneficial 
for all governments which make administrative supervision on their officials as 
PSCOs. 
3.7 Remedy for Undue Delay 
As discussed above, administrative relationship is established as a result of field 
PSC inspection between the Government of the port State and owner/operator of 
the inspected ship under administrative law of the port State.  In this sense, whilst 
the owner/operator alleges that the decision of a PSC inspection, especially 
detention, makes an infringement on its rights in respect of navigation liberty of 
his/her ship of compliance, procedures for challenging the decision or appeal 
should be available.  UNCLOS stipulates the right for appeal from the perspective 
of State liability that States shall take legal responsibility for the damage or loss 
suffered from their measures for enforcing regulations on pollution prevention, and 
recourse of actions shall be in place under national laws.  Since PSC regime is of 
the power of the port State which launches the field inspection, two major 
requirements for the appeal under UNCLOS are clarified. 
 Suffered damage from PSC decision could be submitted to Courts of the port 
State as causes of action for judgment; and 
 The Government is liable for the damage which has been judged unlawful 
under national law of the port State (United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (1982)). 
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Key IMO Treaties of SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW and AFS concentrate specifically 
on the operability that exercising of PSC shall make the best endeavors to avoid 
undue delay of targeted ships, and any loss or damage suffered from the undue 
delay shall be covered by compensation.  In this sense, it seems fair and favorable 
for ship-owners/operators that PSC inspections in fact are conducted with due 
diligence so as to circumvent the dilemma of undue delay.  Even if there have 
been certain faults that lead to damage or loss, legal compensation would guarantee 
the remedy.  Is it the case? 
The cruise ship “Van Gogh” flying the flag of St Vincent & Grenadines was 
detained in May 2006 after arrival of Harwich, UK by Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency (MCA) as a result of inspection alleging the ship’s failure to fully comply 
with statutory requirements under Merchant Shipping Act 1995.  In fact, 93 of 744 
people onboard were suffering from gastroenteritis due to spread of Norovirus at 
that moment.  A few days after detention notice, the previous inspector delivered a 
further notice to the Master, emphasizing that the ship was unfit to go on a voyage 
without serious danger to human life.  In exercise of powers elaborated in Section 
95 of the Act, the ship was prohibited from sailing until the release by a MCA 
officer.  Meanwhile, leaflets as to making references of detention notice to 
arbitration were attached to that notice.  A few hours later, the ship was released 
as a result of re-inspection.  Rather than submitting for arbitration within statutory 
21 days, charterer of the ship litigated in Commercial Court against Department of 
Transport who governed MCA, claiming invalidity of detention and notices 
concerned, statutory compensation, together with damages derived from tort of 
conversion.  In response, the defendant asserted that the ship was dangerously 
unsafe given the high risk of Norovirus which would greatly impair the ability of 
crew in safety navigation, and sought to justify the detention via invoking relevant 
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provisions of Merchant Shipping and Fishing Vessels Regulations 1997 as to the 
power of detaining ships of non-conformity.  While that invoking was not 
approved by the Court since the detention decision was made exclusively on the 
basis of provisions of the Act, the Court held that if the detention was valid under 
either the Act or the Regulation, formation of notices concerned made no sense in 
its validity, i.e. “there should not be a triumph of form over substance”.  The 
cause of action as to conversion was rejected by the Court as the intervention of 
detention did not fall totally and accurately under the scope of torts regulated in 
Torts Act 1997 (International, 2009). 
At that moment, the charterer could merely pin its hope upon the assessment of the 
validity of the detention.  While this paper does not intend to make a satisfying 
judgment, it is notable that 
 The latter notice from the MCA was to considerably complement the former, 
i.e. correcting the procedural defects as per the Act.  However, it appears not the 
achievement since the detention notice “shall specify the matters which make the 
ship a dangerously unsafe ship” (Merchant Shipping Act (1995)); 
 “Dangerously” adds great weight upon “unsafe”.  It is the paramount criterion 
for detention.  A few infections of crewmembers or passengers do not absolutely 
constitute “serious danger to human life” and being “unfit to go to sea” according 
to the Act (Merchant Shipping Act (1995)). 
 As for tort, it is still a major dispute as to whether it shall be embodied in the 
administrative remedy.  The litigation seems to commence a judicial review 
against the detention decision.  Irrespective of the eligible jurisdiction of the 
Commercial Court, damages claim based on committing of tort by Department of 
Transport would not certainly be sustained; and 
 Consequently, available remedy is solely of the statutory compensation.  Even 
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though the charterer – UK-based Travelscope (Wikipedia, 2013) who acquainted 
itself with UK laws – made a series of “professional claims”, it was in great trouble 
since the awarding of statutory compensation is exclusively empowered by the Act 
on the arbitrator who thinks fit whereas the arbitration did not commence the 
arbitration within restriction of 21 days. 
Procedural legitimacy is one key principle in modern administrative law.  As for 
PSC activities which constitute administrative actions, however, the Courts or 
Authorities for review of many States indicate a definite tendency for large 
respecting of professional judgment of inspectors or PSCOs.  In other words, 
interventions such as detention are far likely to be justified as long as they were 
determined by a qualified PSCO who is able to supply adequate evidence 
supporting his/her decision.  Moreover, any challenging processes such as 
arbitration, review and litigation shall not suspend the detention.  In this sense, 
challenging the intervention decisions through local proceedings should be at least 
very much familiar with local laws, thus seems not feasible in reality. 
3.8 The Effect and the Future 
The deficiencies and detentions of ships do not be eliminated through general 
exercise of PSC at international level.  Annual report of Paris MoU 2011 indicates 
most deficiencies were identified in the field of fire safety, with the rate 
progressively increasing from 11.55% in 2009 to 12.89% in 2011, and 56% of bulk 
carriers were inspected with deficiencies (Paris, 2011).  Likewise, the deficiencies 
associated with fire fighting appliance accounted for 19% as per USCG Annual PSC 
Report 2010 (USCG, 2010), and bulk carrier obtained 67 detentions in the total of 
156.  It is reasonable to argue that PSC with deficiencies, even with intervention, is 
still preferable or acceptable for certain owners/operators since cost of voluntary 
compliance is far higher than that of current operable level and of PSC.  In this 
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sense, PSC regime is merely able to compensate partial of non-fulfillment.  
Nevertheless, instruments are adopted and the enforcement is enhanced.  This 
indicates that the general tendency on the global scale of safety and anti-pollution at 
sea is moving towards upgrading of ship-related restrictions primarily because of the 
growing awareness of vulnerability of marine environment and human life, or 
decreasing tolerance on casualties with pollution damages or fatalities.  In other 
words, effective solution of problems in the context of shipping would persistently 
rely on establishment, development, implementation and enforcement of treaty laws 
in the foreseeable future. 
Given the aforesaid “name and shame” scheme, the exposure of those States and 
individuals without sufficient resources in tackling substandard ships would be 
made more frequent.  Moreover, the publicity could be deliberately utilized and 
related to particular States who fail to discharge treaty duties which they ought to be.  
In this sense, an obvious social consequence of PSC regime lies in the impact on the 
reputation of the actors. 
Due to the clear legal framework of PSC regime established under UNCLOS and 
IMO Treaties, States Parties have acquired explicit direction in general.  For the 
purpose of preserving marine environment and protecting individual interests, the 
enforcement of a State is pertaining to its interpretation of applicable international 
regulations and its strategic planning so as to reduce the impact of enforcement on 
national economy.  The consistency of interpretation would be attributable to 
further efforts by IMO and CSs in technical fields, while consistent enforcement 
would be achieved under the auspices of successful inter-jurisdictional PSC 
cooperation.  If PSC regime is living with “diseases”, the cure method would fall 
under international coordination amongst those political and business leaders. 
The strong power of PSC regime under international laws gives rise to the heavy 
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burden upon individual ship-owners/operators as well as certain flag States and port 
States which have not properly discharged their treaty duties.  In the foreseeable 
future, PSC would of course be further strengthened and utilized through the efforts 
of IMO and individual States.  However, operative features guiding the exercise of 
PSC are primarily embodied in relevant IMO resolutions serving as 
recommendations.  In other words, inconsistency in respect of the effects of PSC 
among States would inevitably persist in the future since the available international 
treaties do not elaborate the specific requirements for the performance and criteria 
thereof.  Even though relevant inspection regime within the regional PSC 
cooperation has been established and developed, uniformity at international level 
has not been attained.  This is mainly because the performance level of individual 
States concerning the exercise of PSC power could be assessed but on no condition 
be directly associated with criteria for their compliance of international regulations.  
While the assessment has been conducted via the Voluntary IMO Member State 
Audit Scheme which covers the performance of PSC (IMO, 2005), it could not 
make essential influence upon the specific approach during PSC inspections, even 
though the Audit Scheme refers to the interpretation and implementation of 
applicable international regulations.  In this sense, IMO plans to achieve the 
mandatory Audit Scheme at about 2015 (IMO, 2013a).  While this paper is unable 
to make any prediction on the essence of the upcoming scheme, it is arguable that 
on one hand, it makes no change but setting out the mandatory conditions for 
commencement of the audit; on the other hand, Code for the Implementation of 
Mandatory IMO Instruments, 2011 serving as standard of the Audit would be made 
mandatory together with the scheme.  It is apparent that in the latter case, the 
performance of PSC would be examined in addition to assessment by IMO as per 
Procedure 2011 to which the Code definitely refers.  Rather than establishing of its 
own enforcement force which is not feasible in respect of internal finance and 
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external acceptability, IMO concentrates directly on the performance of member 
States via audit scheme which, combined with PSC regime, constitute the practical 
compulsion of IMO.  Enhancing of PSC regime by virtue of mandatory audit over 
States appears the major tendency. 
3.9 PSC-related Legislation in China 
As discussed above, one of major purposes of PSC regime is to prevent the 
pollution damage within water areas of the port State.  Chinese legislation in this 
respect is relatively matured.  Regulations on Prevention Pollution from Ships was 
promulgated by China State Council and came into effect in March 1st, 2010, which 
constitutes both a good implementation of applicable international regulations and a 
practicable regime for protecting the interests of China, thereby paves the way for 
effective enforcement in respect of anti-pollution in the capacity of the port State 
and the coastal State.  In particular, all ships acting within the water areas, inter 
alia, the harbor waters of China have to comply with relevant Chinese laws and 
international regulations in respect of 
 Structure, equipments and appliances of ships; 
 Activities of discharging hazardous waters, oily waters, sewage, waste gases 
and ballast waters, and dumping; 
 Operations of stripping, washing, bunkering, cargo, repairing, scrapping, etc.; 
and 
 Handling contingency of marine pollution, including investigation, salvage, 
and clean-up (Regulations on Prevention Pollution from Ships (2010)). 
While it is quite comprehensive legislation which covers almost all respects 
relating to anti-pollution, reliance is primarily made on the hindsight.  In other 
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words, given the limit that those deemed very much undoubted in hindsight were 
not so obvious at that moment, more attention should be paid on the proactive 
actions.  In fact, the principle of “prevention first” is stipulated in the Regulation, 
thus given the close interconnection between PSC regime and anti-pollution 
approach under international laws such as UNCLOS and MARPOL China has 
ratified, utilizing PSC regime to minimize pollution risks from foreign ships 
constitutes the optimal strategy or precaution that should be incorporated into the 
enforcement features of this Regulation.  This is why many scholars strongly 
suggest the incorporation of “Shipping Act” into the China law system. 
As for legislation on specific operation of PSC inspections, Ships Inspection Rules 
2009 enacted by China Department of Transport which governs Maritime 
Administration is so far the essential PSC legislation of China which makes great 
progress compared with its predecessor.  It clarifies the concept, application, 
scope of PSC inspection, and recognizes the effects of Tokyo MoU in PSC system 
of China (Ships Inspection Rules (2009)).  Notably, introduction of the principles 
of transparency and public monitoring is exactly compatible with spirits of relevant 
international laws, and recognizing that ship-owners and crewmembers shall take 
prime responsibility for the shipboard maintenance indicates the facilitation of    
PSC operation through domestic legislation.  However, China PSC legislation 
which gives effect to applicable international regulations should at least cover 
major respects as follows. 
 Making legal permission for inspections of foreign-flagged ships under 
jurisdiction; 
 Clarifying PSC authority and PSC inspectors; 
 Clarifying the extent to which international and domestic laws shall be applied 
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during particular inspections;  
 Legitimizing the enforcement or intervention actions against ships of 
substantial non-compliance; and 
 Appeal procedure for challenging the decision during enforcement. 
Therefore, a list of applicable international treaties and national laws during PSC 
inspections should be attached or annexed to the Rules 2009, not only for the 
integrity of legislation, but also for the consistency of operation.  In other words, 
the expression “conform to relevant international treaties China has ratified” that 
widely used within relevant domestic laws is too ambiguous to facilitate the 
enforcement.  Meanwhile, the appeal procedures for challenging the PSC 
decisions should be available in the Rules 2009 not only because of the 
requirements under UNCLOS China ratified in 1996, but also of the consideration 
of responsibility distribution.  While PSCOs practically conduct physical 
inspections, they merely take charge of evidence collection.  Therefore, the 
PSCOs should responsible for the breaches of national laws during physical 
inspections in respect of requirements for China officials.  The decision according 
to evidence is made by the PSC authority employing those PSCOs, thus the local 
PSC authority, i.e. legal department of local branches of China MSA, should be 
responsible for reconsideration so as to determine the legitimacy and 
appropriateness of alleged PSC inspection/decision as per China administrative law 
(Administrative Reconsideration Act (1999)).  Once actions in Courts commence 
thereby, the aforesaid local PSC authority should respond as the defendant in the 
course of judicial review which is entitled to make final decision on the legitimacy 




By way of conclusion, PSC in accordance with UNCOLS is a power of the coastal 
State to protect its interests in respect of safety navigation, security and 
anti-pollution.  Meanwhile, the port State is entitled to investigate any violation of 
anti-pollution regulations under UNCLOS so as to ensure effective enforcement at 
international level, irrespective of where the violation occurs and the consequences.  
Since UNCLOS expressly requires States Parties during enforcement being subject 
to the generally accepted international regulations through the competent 
international organization which refers exclusively to IMO, the legal certainty under 
UNCLOS of the status of relevant IMO Treaties is in place.  While UNCLOS 
stipulates general requirements, effective enforcement should rely on the 
implementation and enforcement of relevant IMO Treaties which regulates specific 
operative features.  Given the circumstances that imbalance among States in 
respect of implementation and enforcement of IMO Treaties exists, PSC regime as a 
major measure against non-compliance of individual ships is strongly advocated by 
IMO, and has been developed through the regional PSC cooperation, serving as a 
mechanism of constant monitoring under which performance of flag States of 
inspected ships has been placed.  Therefore, PSC regime could be deemed 
successful in practice especially in respect of the restrictions over 
ship-owners/operators who assume the prime obligations of maintenance.  It 
reveals the definite tendency of contemporary international legislation on the 
common and urgent needs within international community which could not be 
resolved through the practice of individual States.  In this sense, effective solution 
makes reliance on treaty laws which set out international regime in respect of 
cooperation and monitoring.  However, the general exercise of PSC regime could 
not preclude the unqualified performance of flag States and individual actors, the 
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“name and shame” scheme appears not beneficial on all occasions because of the 
large subjective elements involved, and legal proceedings for the remedy of undue 
delay under port States’ national law seems not feasible from the perspective of 
ship-owners/operators.  In this sense, it is necessary to establish effective 
cooperation of individual States with Classification Societies in order to achieve the 
accuracy and harmonization in respect of interpretation of international regulations 
and the national legislation which gives effect to those international regulations.  
The effective enforcement of MARPOL regulations in respect of controlling the 
emission of sulphur oxides from ships on the viewpoint of IMO’s Secretary-General 
Mr. Koji Sekimizu relies primarily on the contribution of oil industry which makes 
low-sulphur fuel suitable and available for the shipping industry (IMO, 2013c).  
Likewise, if political and business leaders at national and international level 
endeavor seriously to pave the way for effective PSC through due planning, 
coordination and cooperation, more restrictions would be imposed upon the 
operation of ships of non-compliance.  In the future, PSC regime would be further 
strengthened through the efforts of IMO, individual States and regional PSC 
cooperation, inter alia, IMO’s mandatory audit scheme. 
While China has made considerable progress on PSC, future consideration should 
be made on enhancing the national legislation in respect of integrity, accuracy, and 
operability.  Since national legislation should duly give effect to applicable 
international regulations in accordance with international law, it plays a significant 
role in exhibiting the basic attitude of a State towards international relations.  In 
this sense, a set of integral PSC legislation of China concerning both substantive and 
procedural rules would not only facilitate the enforcement of national players, but 
also indicate the certainty of enforcement by Chinese Government on safeguarding 
safety navigation, anti-pollution, maritime security and welfare of seafarers at both 
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national level and international level.  The vision might fall under the situation that 
no prudent ship-owner/operator would deliver their ships of substantial 
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